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Abstract
Previous work has shown that quality-quantity interactions may alter
the typical results of private management under the assumption of myopic
behavior. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the role of feedback
strategies in a model containing an integrated quantity-quality approach,
analyzing the impact on water use, pollution and shadow resource prices.
The case of symmetric players is shown to yield results that are simi-
lar to those of models in previous literature, in that it establishes myopic
and optimal solutions as extremes, with feedback solutions somewhere in
between. However, as di¤erent water users do not have similar objectives
or constraints, it is important to consider the case of asymmetric players.
This paper shows that when agents are asymmetric, especially as regards
external e¤ects, strategic solutions can be more extreme than the myopic
ones.
Keywords: feedback Nash strategies, common property externalities,
groundwater management, asymmetric players
1
1. Introduction1
Groundwater is often exploited as a common property resource, with access granted
to a number of agents who pump water according to their own interests. Moreover,
some water uses can produce signi…cant changes in water quality with negative
implications for other agents. Both quantity and quality externalities are wide-
spread, so it would be natural to suppose that optimal management brings about
a larger aquifer of better quality than what noncooperating agents would gener-
ate in a common property setting. It has been shown that this is not necessarily
true: intervention may lower quantity while improving quality, or even lower qual-
ity while improving quantity (the exact result will depend, among other things,
on the properties of the water quality regeneration function. See Roseta-Palma
(2002)) However, those results were obtained considering that agents in a common
property setting behaved myopically, ignoring both the dynamics of the aquifer
and the actions of other users. The use of the myopic assumption as representative
of “competitive” (ie. unregulated) common property management in groundwater
goes back at least to the seminal paper by Gisser and Sanchez (1980). Yet the nat-
ural characteristics of groundwater indicate that users may take less shortsighted
decisions. This paper develops a model of joint quality-quantity management in
a dynamic game framework, considering both the stock of water quantity and a
stock measure of water quality and analysing di¤erent assumptions of behaviour
for the water users. In particular, the myopic and the feedback Nash solutions are
examined and compared to the optimal solution.
The myopic solution is obtained considering that agents are essentially oblivi-
ous to the dynamics of interaction between players and to the movements of state
variables. Thus each agent selects his control variables (water extraction as well
as possible contaminant use) to maximize individual current pro…t. In reality,
access to groundwater is usually restricted to a well known area where there are a
…xed number of wells, so models of strategic behaviour seem to provide a more ap-
propriate setting. In the context of an n-player noncooperative diferential game,
1Support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, project POCTI/ECO/41127/2001 is
gratefully acknowledged.
open-loop Nash equilibria consist of solutions where each player makes his own
decisions while taking the speci…c decisions of other players are as given. This
type of solution requires each player to choose from the outset the entire tempo-
ral paths for control variables that it will commit to, thus it is not very realistic
either. The analysis of feedback Nash equilibria, on the other hand, is carried out
considering that each player chooses strategies consisting of rules for the control
variable. These feedback strategies are rules that result in actions of the players
conditional on the current values of state variables and, therefore, require agents
to adjust their decisions in each period according to the observed state of the sys-
tem, but continue using their strategy independently of deviations by the other
players.
Several papers have considered feedback strategies in environmental prob-
lems of pollution control (see for example Xepapadeas (1995), Dockner and Long
(1993), List and Mason (2001)). The case of groundwater management in particu-
lar has been dealt with in Xepapadeas (1996), which considers a quantity-quality
problem where contamination depends only on the amount of water pumped,
in Provencher and Burt (1993), which analyses the impact of strategical behav-
ior on the e¢ciency of the common property solution, and in Rubio and Casino
(2001), which contains a quantity-only management model and investigates non-
linear feedback strategies. All of these papers consider symmetrical water users
and most establish myopic and optimal solutions as extremes, with feedback so-
lutions somewhere in between. The main objective of this paper is to extend
the feedback common property framework to a model containing an integrated
quantity-quality approach, analyzing the impact on water use, pollution and
shadow resource prices. Moreover, as di¤erent economic agents do not have sim-
ilar objectives or constraints, it is important to consider the case of asymmetric
players. In particular, the paper develops a model that distinguishes between
agricultural use and public water supply, and analyzes the resulting interactions
under alternative common property arrangements. The main result is that the
strategic considerations inherent to the feedback solution may take agents even
further away from the optimum than what be expected if common property man-
agement was myopic. The symmetric case is presented in the following section,
for comparison with previous results in the literature and also to highlight the
novelty of the asymmetric model results.
2. Symmetric model
In this section it is assumed that M identical agents exploit a stock of ground-
water that receives a constant recharge, R: The size of the aquifer is re‡ected
on the pumping lift, L; de…ned as the distance between the land surface and the
water level. Water quality is represented by the level of contamination, C, which
a¤ects the pro…tability of water use. All agents produce some good using water
and another input according to a production function y(gt; nt;Ct), where gt is the
amount of water used and nt is the amount of an input whose use creates pollu-
tion. It is are assumed that there are positive but diminishing marginal returns
for both inputs:2 @y@g ;
@y
@n > 0;
@2y
@g2 ;
@2y
@n2 < 0 and that they are complementary in
production @2y@g@n > 0: The in‡uence of water contamination on production could
take di¤erent forms (see Roseta-Palma (2002)), but the most commonly used as-
sumptions denote the idea that contaminated water reduces both total production
and the marginal productivities of inputs: @y@C < 0;
@2y
@g@C < 0; and
@2y
@n@C < 0:
The cost of groundwater extraction depends on lift and on the amount of water
pumped, k(gt; Lt): In this case pumping costs are assumed to take the form of a
constant unit cost k per unit of water pumped per distance lifted, ie. kgtLt. Thus
the current net bene…t of production at t for each agent is given by
¼t = Pyy(nt; gt;Ct) ¡ k(gt; Lt) ¡ Pnnt (1)
where Py is the price of y and Pn is the price of n. The evolution of lift, L can be
represented by:
_L =
(1¡ ®)gT ¡ R
AS
(2)
where gT = Mgt is the total water used, ® is the return coe¢cient (which can be
zero for fully consumptive uses), A is aquifer area and S is the speci…c yield. It
2The t subscript is dropped to simplify notation whenever possible.
is assumed that there is a constant natural decay rate for the pollutant, so that
contamination evolves according to:
_C = Me(nt) ¡ ±Ct (3)
Thus water quality degrades as it receives contaminant loads, which originate on
the surface and percolate towards groundwater according to a pollution production
function that depends positively on the amount of polluting input.3. To preserve
symmetry between agents, the evolution of both contamination and lift is assumed
to a¤ect all users homogeneously and instantaneously.
If the behavior of the agents is myopic, decisions on inputs are taken to max-
imize (1), which for interior solutions implies …rst order conditions:
Py
@y
@g
= kLt (4)
Py
@y
@n
= Pn (5)
This solution equates marginal bene…t of inputs to the individual agent with
their marginal costs, and is ine¢cient since it ignores e¤ects on the state variables
as well as on other agents. Given a discount rate ½, the optimal management
solution requires maxM
1R
0
¼te¡½tdt subject to (2) and (3), as well as initial condi-
tions for L and C and non-negativity restrictions on inputs and C: In general, for
uncon…ned aquifers L will also be non-negative and it will be further restricted
by some maximum value. Using the current value Hamiltonean
H = M [Pyy(nt; gt;Ct) ¡ kgtLt ¡ Pnnt]+¸t
·
(1 ¡ ®)Mgt ¡ R
AS
¸
+¯t [Me(nt) ¡ ±Ct]
3 In general, the contaminant loads could depend on gt as well as nt : However, the role of
applied water is ambiguous, since it might act as a carrier for pollutants or diminish the load,
either by dilution or by promoting plant uptake (in the case of agriculture).
optimal conditions for interior solutions are:
Py
@y
@g
= kLt ¡ ¸t(1¡ ®)AS (6)
Py
@y
@n
= Pn ¡ ¯t @e@n (7)
_¸ = ½¸t + kgtM (8)
_¯ = (½ + ±)¯t ¡ Py @y@C M (9)
Comparing equations (4) and (5) with (6) and (7), with both co-state variables
taking negative values (as they are the shadow prices for state variables that are
detrimental in the objective function), there are additional terms on the optimal
conditions. These represent the extra marginal costs of input use through their
impact on state variables, and will ensure that for given values of L and C optimal
input use will be lower than the individualmyopic decision. However, even if initial
conditions are similar, after di¤erent decisions are taken the paths for L and C will
not coincide, and paths for g and n cannot be contrasted in general. Nonetheless,
steady state conditions can be analysed and compared. Any steady state will be
de…ned by _L = 0; _C = 0; yielding
gSS =
R
M (1¡ ®) (10)
CSS =
Me(nSS)
±
(11)
Equation (10) indicates that the steady state amount of water that can be
pumped by each agent is entirely de…ned by natural recharge and the number
of agents, and it will not depend on the management arrangement. Equation
(11) indicates the steady state relationship between contamination and input use,
which is positive since @e@n > 0. Using the steady state conditions, it can be seen
from equations (5) and (7) that contamination levels and input use will be higher
in the private, myopic solution. However, from equations (4) and (6), optimal
steady state lift may be higher or lower. In particular, LSSopt < LSSmb unless
@y
@g
SS
opt
is
su¢ciently larger than @y@g
SS
mb
;in which case the opposite occurs. The possibility of
a smaller water stock (higher lift) in the optimal case can be explained by recalling
that the water is of higher quality and thus more productive.
Under the assumption of feedback strategies, each agent is expected to have a
state-dependent decision rule. The simplest case is that of linear Markov strate-
gies, which although it is rather crude can be a sensible assumption in certain
circumstances, namely when the dynamic game has a linear quadratic structure.
Rubio and Casino (2001) discuss the use of nonlinear strategies in a quantity-only
groundwater management problem and conclude that, given restricted initial con-
ditions (such as a natural hydrologic steady state), the linear strategy may perform
better since it may be the only strategy that leads to a stable steady state.4 In the
present case, with two control and two state variables, and considering the nature
of the agent’s problem, it will be assumed that the relevant linear strategies for
each player i consist, in each moment t, of
git = g
i ¡ °1Lt ¡ °2Ct (12)
nit = ni ¡ º1Lt ¡ º2Ct (13)
where °1; °2 and º1; º2 are parameters representing the reaction of the decision
variables to the values observed for the state variables. The same rules are ap-
plied by all the players, since they are assumed to be identical, and the reaction
parameters are invariant with time.
In this setting, each agent solves problem max
1R
0
¼ite¡½tdt assuming that the
4Tsutsui and Mino (1990) examine the possibility of obtaining a more e¢cient equilibrium
using nonlinear strategies in a duopoly with sticky prices, without guessing the type of value
function. However, their method is applicable to the case of one state variable.
laws of motion for lift and contamination are:
_L =
(1¡ ®)
"
git +
P
j 6=i
¡
gj ¡ °1Lt ¡ °2Ct
¢# ¡ R
AS
(14)
=
(1¡ ®) £git + (M ¡ 1)(g j ¡ °1Lt ¡ °2Ct)¤ ¡ R
AS (15)
_C = e(nit) +
X
j 6=i
e(nj ¡ ºCt) ¡ ±Ct (16)
= e(nit) + (M ¡ 1)e(nj ¡ ºCt)¡ ±Ct (17)
The corresponding …rst order conditions for g and n are the same as in the optimal
case, equations (6) and (7), except the shadow prices of L and C will take on
di¤erent values, re‡ecting the individual perspective on the laws of motion. This
is re‡ected in the evolution of shadow prices:
_¸ i =
µ
½+
1 ¡ ®
AS
(M ¡ 1)°1
¶
¸it + kg
i
t + ¯
i
t(M ¡ 1) @e@nº1 (18)
_¯ i =
µ
½+ ± +
@e
@n
(M ¡ 1)º2
¶
¯it ¡ Py @y@C +
1¡ ®
AS
(M ¡ 1)°2¸it (19)
At the steady state, given symmetry, equations (10) and (11) hold, as well as
¸iSS = ¡kg
SS + ¯iSS (M ¡ 1) @e@nº1
½ + 1¡®AS (M ¡ 1)°1
(20)
¯iSS =
Py @y@C ¡ 1¡®AS (M ¡ 1)°2¸iSS
½ + ± + @e@n(M ¡ 1)º2
(21)
Comparing these expressions with the equivalent ones from the optimal case
(which derive from setting the movement equations (8) and (9) to zero), it can
be concluded that both shadow prices used by the common property agents in
a feedback setting are smaller in absolute value than the optimal ones.5 Thus,
as long as ¸iSS and ¯iSS remain negative, which they should since they are the
same for all players and it would not make sense for lift or contamination to be
5The result is unambiguous provided
¯¯¯
@ y
@C
iSS
¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯
@y
@C
SS
opt
M
¯¯¯
:
seen as “good” for everyone, …rst order conditions indicate that both steady state
contamination and steady state lift will be between the myopic and the optimal
values. This result is similar to other results in the literature (see for example
Rubio and Casino (2001), Xepapadeas (1995)).
3. Two distinct groups of agents
In this section we distinguish between two types of players with di¤erent char-
acteristics. In particular, we consider two water uses that give rise to di¤erent
bene…ts but also have distinct quality requirements: farming and public supply.
The particular problem that is studied is typical of agricultural areas where irri-
gation is signi…cant and other water sources are not abundant, such as in many
aquifers in the south of the Iberian Peninsula. On the one hand, there is a group
of farmers who extract water from the underlying aquifer to irrigate their crops;
not only does this reduce availability of water quantitatively, but the discharges
from this group of players are also assumed to worsen the quality of the remaining
groundwater.6 On the other hand, there are urban users, represented by a public
water supplier who also retrieves water from the same aquifer. This second group
of users has quality requirements, which give rise to treatment costs anytime the
water is too contaminated. In this model, although quantity externalities arise
from both users’ decisions, the contamination externality is only from the farmers
to the urban users. There could also be “within group” externalities, especially
among farmers, but those are assumed to be comparatively unimportant so that
each group can be treated as a single agent.
The problem for the group of agricultural users is summarized by a net bene…t
function in each period:
¼a = Pyy(n; ga)¡ kgaL ¡ Pnn (22)
where ga is the amount of groundwater pumped by this group and other variables
are as before (n represents a polluting input used in agricultural production, such
6These quality worsening discharges are not necessarily associated with the use of polluting
inputs. For instance, salinity in aquifers can be caused directly by water withdrawals.
as fertiliser.or pesticides).
As for public supply, the only decision variable is how much water to take
from the aquifer for domestic users (gd). Given a negatively sloped water demand
function, Pd(g); with the associated consumer surplus, and given treatment costs
kT (C; gd) = kTgdC , net bene…t can be expressed as:
¼d =
gdZ
0
Pd(g)dg ¡ kgdL ¡ kTgdC (23)
The optimal solution to this management problem involves the maximization of
1R
0
(¼a + ¼d) e¡½tdt on the three decision variables, subject to the movement equa-
tions (2) and (3), duly adapted to re‡ect the structure of the asymetric problem,
as well as initial conditions and relevant restrictions. In particular, equation (2)
will now represent total water extraction as the sum of both users’ withdrawals,
corrected by the return coe¢cient for ga but not for gd; which normally will go
into a sewage system and not percolate back down to the aquifer:
_L =
(1¡ ®)ga + gd ¡ R
AS
(24)
First order conditions can be summarized as:
Py
@y
@ga
= kL ¡ ¸ (1¡ ®)
AS
(25)
Pd(gd) = kL + kTC ¡ ¸AS (26)
Py
@y
@n
= Pn ¡ ¯ @e@n (27)
_¸ = ½¸+ k(ga + gd) (28)
_¯ = (½+ ±)¯ + kTgd (29)
Conditions (25) and (27) are similar to the previous case. Condition (26)
equates marginal costs and bene…ts of water extraction for domestic users. Note
that the shadow price of lift, ¸; appears in both (25) and (26), and its path is
explained by the impact of lift on pumping costs (equation 28). Finally, equation
(29) shows the evolution of the shadow price of contamination, re‡ecting only its
e¤ect on treatment costs of domestic users since by assumption there is no impact
on agricultural productivity. Both shadow prices are negative at the optimal
steady state.
To describe the myopic solution, the …rst three equations above can be used,
simply setting ¸ and ¯ to zero. Some comparisons can be established between the
myopic and the optimal case, but di¤erent combinations are possible. Initially,
myopic users of both types will pump more than they should and farmers will
apply more of the polluting input, so that the state variables of the system will
diverge. At the steady state, the picture is not as clear as in the symmetric
case, because _L = 0 now yields (1 ¡ ®)gSSa + gSSd = R; implying that di¤erent
management schemes can result in di¤erent ways of sharing the natural recharge
among the two groups. Instead of highligthing the possible comparisons that can
be made between these two steady state solutions, we will proceed henceforth to
the feedback equilibrium, which yields more interesting results.
The agricultural group will decide ga and n assuming a strategy for gd based
on L and C; since both of these variables a¤ect public supply costs, gd = gd(L;C):
The domestic side, on the other hand, will select gd assuming that strategies for
both ga and n depend only on L; ga(L) and n(L):7 The equilibrium (or equilibria,
7Recall that feedback strategies are based on each user taking the other’s strategy as given, so
that perceived decisions for the other at any time are based only on current values of state vari-
ables. No one takes into consideration that those values in turn depend on their own decisions.
If on e  u ser did acknow ledge  th at ind ir ect e¤ect of his ow n decision s,  it would b e  a  Stackelberg
game  sett in g.  How ever,  in many  continuous t ime  models th e  two  typ es of games coincide  (see
Rubio (2003)).
in general) will be given by the simultaneous solution of the following two systems:
Py
@y
@ga
= kL ¡ ¸a (1¡ ®)AS (30)
Py
@y
@n
= Pn ¡ ¯a @e@n (31)
_¸
a =
Ã
½ ¡
@gd
@L
AS
!
¸a + kga (32)
_¯
a = (½+ ±)¯a ¡
@gd
@C
AS
¸a (33)
and
Pd(gd) = kL + kTC ¡ ¸dAS (34)
_¸
d =
Ã
½ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
dga
dL
AS
!
¸d + kgd ¡ ¯d dedn
dn
dL
(35)
_¯
d = (½+ ±)¯d + kTgd (36)
One immediately noticeable thing about this solution is that shadow prices
will be distinct for a and d. In fact, it can easily be seen from equations (33)
and (36) that at the steady state ¯a and ¯d actually have opposite signs. The
agricultural group, which is not directly a¤ected by contamination, will strategi-
cally consider lower water quality as a good thing, because it reduces the quantity
of water extracted for public supply. A similar disparity may arise on ¸; but in
this case shadow prices do not always have opposite signs as each user weighs
his own direct costs of increasing lift against the indirect bene…ts from decreasing
the other user’s withdrawals. Hence, although it is di¢cult to get general results
for steady state L and C for each of the three situations (myopic, feedback, and
optimal), comparing the shadow prices and the resulting marginal net bene…ts
for each decision variable, a new result appears, which is that the strategic con-
siderations inherent to the feedback solution may take agents even further away
from the optimum than what would be expected if common property management
was myopic. Such a result arises from the explicit consideration of asymmetric
characteristics and carries some policy implications. For instance, if taxes were to
be introduced in order to correct existing externalities, the analysis of agents’ be-
havior regarding each other is of utmost importance. The myopic solution is often
considered the worst case solution, but this section has shown that with asymme-
try, and speci…cally with asymmetric external e¤ects, strategic considerations by
agents may lead to an even worse scenario.
4. Conclusion
Many natural resources are exploited in common property settings, where a …xed
number of users has access to the resource and each one’s decisions a¤ect the
state of the resource for everyone. Unlike free access situations, in common prop-
erty the users who are sharing the resource often have some mutual knowledge
of each other. Moreover, the same users have access to the resource over time.
Thus, to assume that in unregulated private management each agent will behave
myopically, maximizing only current pro…t and ignoring resource stock dynam-
ics and neighbours’ behaviour, is particularly naive. To provide a more realistic
comparison of unregulated management with the …rst-best optimal solution re-
quires an explicit consideration of alternative strategies for the users that do not
require them to be so extremely shortsighted. One interesting possibility is to use
a dynamic game setting to analyse feedback Nash equilibria, where each player is
assumed to consider the dynamics of the resource as well as other players’ deci-
sion rules. Such rules depend only on the current values of the state variables, not
on their histories. Groundwater is a typical common property situation, as ac-
cess is usually limited to owners of overlying land. External e¤ects are pervasive,
since each user’s actions diminish.quantity for everyone and may have signi…cant
impacts on quality as well.
This paper develops a dynamic model of groundwater management, consid-
ering both the stock of water quantity (as represented by pumping lift) and a
stock measure of water quality. The myopic and the feedback Nash solutions are
examined and compared to the optimal solution. The results obtained for the sym-
metric case, where there is no heterogeneity among users, are similar to those in
previous literature, namely in concluding that with feedback behaviour strategic
considerations lead agents to a solution that is somewhere in between the myopic
and the optimal solutions. However, explicitly considering asymmetry between
water users leads to di¤erent results. The asymmetric model used in the paper is
based on a situation that is frequently encountered in agricultural areas: ground-
water is used for irrigation and also tapped for public supply of urban areas. These
two users get di¤erent bene…ts from the water, and most importantly, they have
very di¤erent quality requirements. Moreover, irrigated agriculture also a¤ects
the quality of groundwater. Results for the asymmetric model indicate that the
strategic considerations inherent to the feedback solution may take agents even
further away from the optimum than what would be expected if common property
management was myopic.
Two lines of further research seem interesting: one regards the analysis of other
asymmetric games in environmental and natural resource economics to establish
general conditions for the emergence of strategic considerations similar to those
found in the groundwater quantity-quality game. Another relates to the analysis
of speci…c aquifers with quantity-quality problems, in the line of many previous
papers that evaluate e¢ciency losses from unregulated vs. optimal management,
to ascertain the empirical relevance of the strategic externality. Such investigations
will require numerical simulations with speci…c functional forms.
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